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Close of the Age of Dams
by Marc P. Reisner
I
In 1978. the year I moved to San Francisco to begin writ-
ing Cadillac Desert, the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse rode off
into a bowl of heat and dust and the Sixth flashed in on a flood.
The previous water year-which, in California. runs from
October to the following September-had been the driest since
recordkeeping began; water year 1976 had been the third driest.
But late in 1977 the skies miraculously opened, and water year
1978 ended up as one of the wettest on record. It was a first act.
By February of 1979. spillways were roaring at dams whose
reservoirs had almost gone dry two years before. In 1980. the
third year In a row categorized as -very wet," the jet stream, car-
rying storms like aircraft in a landing pattern at O'Hare. took
aim at southern California. and for weeks the Los Angeles River
was so swollen with runoff there was talk of building an aque-
duct to send it north
Then came the really big water years. the El Niho winters of
1982 and 1983. No one fully understands why the ocean warms
during El Niiio episodes-vast climatic oscillations are
involved-and you can't safely predict the result, but strong El
Niiios tend to coincide with heavy precipitation years. The early
Eighties El Niflo was the sharpest warming on record. The first
huge storm hit the California coast, just after Christmas in 1982.
Winds over Mount Tamalpais, north of the Golden Gate Bridge,
blew a hundred and ten miles an hour, and. after a truck tum-
bled onto its side. the bridge itself was closed for only the sec-
ond time since it was built The thousands of gouges, slumps.
and landslide tracks that you see in the hills surrounding San
Francisco Bay were mostly caused by that storm, which dumped
more rain in an hour than parts of California ordinarily see in a
year. During the following winter, superstorms such as this were
routine. In the Sierra Nevada. the standing snowfall record of
750 inches. set in 1906, was eclipsed by fifteen feet. Yosemite
Valley was underwater. The storms, bloated with subtropical
moisture that seemed to be flash-evaporating from the ocean,
were not wrung out, as they usually are, by the Sierra-Cascade
blockade. Mirages in Nevada and Utah filled with real water; the
Great Salt Lake flooded highways miles from its fleeing shore.
The Colorado River at spring melt was unofficially gauged at
350.000 cubic feet per second; that was the flood that damaged
the spillway directly under Glen Canyon Dam and-by washing
in millions of cubic yards of silt-hastened Lake Powell's ongo-
ing metamorphosis from reservoir to farmland.
The El Neflo episode played itself out by 1985, and the
weather returned to normal for a year or two. until, on
Valentine's Day in 1986-just as Cadillac Desert first went to
press-one of the three biggest California storms since the turn
of the century decided to make landfall.
I was in a Santa Monica hotel room when the frontal sys-
tem approached the coast_ I awakened to a radio weatherman
in midsentence. saying something about an electronic buoy a
few dozen miles offshore that was sending in low-pressure
readings such as you measure inside the eye of a hurricane. I
scrapped my plans and decided to flee for home. The ocean
below my window was all whitecaps and tremendous gunmetal-
gray swells. Ocean Avenue was already a litter of palm fronds
torn off the trees by flailing winds. My flight was one of the last
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to leave before the LAX tower radioed pilots to reroute
or wait out the worst of it. Forty tons of flying machine
felt like a hummingbird in a gale; a flight attendant
tumbled across three rows of passengers when the air-
craft fell down an elevator shaft. As we landed in San
Francisco in horizontal sheets of rain, screams and
prayers turned to tears of relief. A few of us went
straight to an airport bar and, at two in the afternoon,
got stone-drunk.
The storm series lasted, almost without interrup-
tion, for ten days, lending credibility to Noah's flood.
Central and northern California, where most of the big
reservoirs are, were the hardest hit. I had always had a
mordant wish to watch a dam collapse, and this
seemed like the best opportunity I might get in my life.
I arrived at Oroville Dam just as the storm was begin-
ning to break up. (It took me hours longer than usual
to get there, because shallow lakes had formed across
interstate 680, creating instant new refuges for mal-
lards and pintails.) In the previous week and a half, the
Feather River watershed at five thousand feet had
unofficially recorded fifty-five inches of precipitation,
most of it as rain, which melted several feet of snow
lying on the ground. Tampa gets that much rain in an
average year. The spillway at Oroville is a big concrete
channel that loops around the right abutment of the
immense earthen dam. It was dumping a hundred and
fifty thousand cubic feet of water per second, a couple
of rivers the size of the Tennessee. That much water in
that confined a space-the spillway is about as wide
as a basketball court-is in a hurry-up mood. My guess
is that it was moving thirty or forty miles per hour.
Small trees and shrubs lining the spillway fence were
bent double under the force of vortex winds created by
so much mass in a rush. A crow, sailing arrogantly a
few feet overhead, suddenly executed some frantic
maneuvers to avoid being sucked in himself; he too
had never seen anything like this before. Where the
spillway poured the river back into the river below the
dam-it didn't so much pour in as fly in-a dense
plume of mist mushroomed eighty stories high, split
by three arching rainbows.
A dam did actually burst during the flood, though
I didn't see it happen. It was a temporary cofferdam
built at the prospective site of Auburn Dam, whose
construction had been mired in lawsuits and debate
for years. The cofferdam held back about a hundred
thousand acre-feet of water-thirty-two billion gal-
lons-that merged, almost instantaneously, with a
river already swollen to ten times its normal size. The
flood-on-a-flood headed into Folsom Lake, which sits
twenty miles above Sacramento and has a capacity of
about a million acre-feet. Folsom Dam would have to
spill the whole reservoir, 320 billion gallons of water,
in three or four days in order to absorb the mythic
flood pouring in. If it did not, the dam itself would be
jeopardized, and if Folsom ended up like Teton Dam
then a lot of Sacramento would float under the Golden
Gate Bridge. When I arrived, a whole crowd of disaster
buffs was already there, held at bay by dozens of high-
way patrol. I managed to sneak briefly onto the dam
crest anyway; it trembled as a bank might tremble dur-
ing a hurricane. The spillway at Folsom, a concrete and
rock dam, was built into its center; it's really a man-
made, two-hundred-foot waterfall. At the time, It was
dumping much more water than Niagara Falls. You
couldn't have heard a jet taking off five hundred feet
away; that's the kind of noise a million pounds of water
makes-a million pounds a second-as it tumbles a
couple of hundred feet and crashes into a canyon
riverbed. (If Folsom was going to be destroyed, It
would probably be a consequence of the falling river
chewing out the bedrock on which the dam was built.)
The waterfall reversed direction about eighty yards
downriver and rose up in a towering, backfalling
hydraulic wave that raced back and crashed into the
dam's downstream face, as if it wanted a second
chance to knock it to smithereens. Rapids with big
reversal waves are the kind that kayakers fear most,
because you can be trapped forever in the churning
backwash. In a reversal of such monstrous size, a
kayaker would have had the free will of a toothpick. A
group of boaters was standing near me, screaming at
one another over the river's roar; they were debating
how long it would take before a trapped boater was
ground down to individual molecules.
The Department of Water Resources later estimat-
ed that ten million acre-feet of runoff-enough for the
city of San Francisco for forty years-had poured out
the Golden Gate in two weeks. The crew of a freighter
miles out to sea that was plowing through huge waves
off the Gate said the wash coming across the bow tast-
ed almost like Evian.
Californians didn't know it yet, but they were rid-
ing a meteorological roller coaster, and the great '86
storm was the crest before the giant drop. During all
but one of the five subsequent water years, the runoff
of all the rivers emptying into San Francisco Bay was
less than the runoff measured from February 14 to
February 28 in 1986. By 1992, nearly all of the state had
suffered through six dry or critically dry years In a
row-the fiercest drought since the Dust Bowl, when
California had seven million people instead of the thir-
ty-one million who officially live there today.
Unlike the drought of the mid-Seventies, which
held the state in a vise grip for a couple of years and
suddenly let go, this drought was like a lobster headed
for the pot-it clamped down savagely, held on relent-
lessly, and then really began to squeeze. By 1990, one
of Santa Barbara's two water-supply reservoirs was a
plain of sun-cracked mud. The other, bigger one was
about a quarter full. A few years earlier, therapists in
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southern California reported that they were seeing lots
of people showing clinical signs of depression because
the sun had disappeared for weeks. Now some of the
same people were spray-painting their lawns green
and hiring Indian rain dancers to try to coax in a cloud.
Santa Barbara, a pretty city situated on a sliver of plain
between hulking mountains and the sea, used to cher-
ish its geographic isolation and its minimal water sup-
ply because both helped to constrain growth, which
most people there abhor; it is the one major city In
southern California that decided not to hook into the
State Water Project. By 1991, however, panicked Santa
Barbarans had voted to build a spur to the California
Aqueduct through ranges of mountains, at a cost of
hundreds of millions of dollars. and to construct one of
the world's largest desalination plants, which will cost
them many millions more.
Had it not been for a series of storms that came
onshore in March, when the rainy season is usually
about to end, the 1991 water year would have been the
driest in California history. Until those storms arrived.
precipitation in some parts of the state was less than
20 percent of normal, and measured runoff was as low
as 5 percent of normal. Even when it did rain, hardly
any runoff made it into the reservoirs-the famished
landscape soaked it all up. Nineteen ninety-two--the
year in which I am now writing-has been much the
same. December and January. which are usually the
wettest months, were numbingly dry, but toward the
close of the rainy season, for two or three weeks.
southern and central California were battered by
storms. Not much of the runoff could be captured,
because from Monterey south. California has few
reservoirs of real size-it doesn't rain enough in the
south to make building them worthwhile, and when it
does rain it often rains violently, so the rivers carry
great volumes of sediment and debris. (A small reser-
voir built on Malibu Creek in the 1920s had utterly silt-
ed up by the mid-1940s.) Meanwhile, northern
California, where the real reservoirs are, was again
bypassed by the biggest storms, and so. as I write this.
the state is entering the dry season and its sixth con-
secutive year of drought-with less than half its usual
water supply on tap.
As it happened, the drought was just a backdrop
against which a patently Californian sturnt und drang
was being acted out. In 1989, northern California was
hit by an earthquake that, though not exactly colos-
sal-it released about 3 percent as much energy as the
San Francisco earthquake of 1906-killed dozens of
people and caused seven billion dollars' worth of dam-
age to homes, buildings, and public infrastructure.
Two years later, an enormous wildfire swept the
Oakland Hills, destroying twenty-five hundred homes.
taking more lives, and inflicting at least two billion
dollars' worth of damage. Only a few weeks afterward,
on Interstate 5. the worst mass highway collision in
U.S. history occurred, involving 151 cars. About a year
later, a pair of walloping earthquakes jolted the
Mojave Desert. which has become suburban Los
Angeles. In the midst of this litany was a hard winter
freeze that wiped out a $1.5 billion citrus crop and yet
another earthquake, which reduced much of the lovely
town of Femdale. far up on the north coast, to rubble.
loan Didion. once described the state as an
.amphitheater of natural disaster.' and all these
events bore her out-life in California was imitating a
heavy metal cartoon. Only none of these was natural
disaster in any true sense. Earthquakes are quite
harmless until you decide to put millions of people
and two trillion dollars In real estate atop scissile fault
zones. California is not Brazil. and it is far north of
Florida-orchard growers are always gambling with
frost. The mass collision, a macabre excitement on the
world's most boring stretch of interstate, was caused
by a huge cloud of dust blowing off a cotton field that
had been plowed bare and then fallowed due to the
drought, Everything about California that is contrived
and man-made and therefore vulnerable came togeth-
er for the Oakland Hills fire: It began with a match or a
cigarette dropped in a field of Turkish grass gone to
straw (the native bunchgrasses, which can tolerate
drought, have been all but usurped by invasive vari-
eties); the grass fire spread into a grove of Australian
eucalyptus trees, which can stand a drought but not a
hard freeze; the resin-rich eucalyptus, which burn
fiercely when frost-killed, went off like Roman candles.
showering embers from roof to wood-shingle roof.
The drought itself, which may end up a more cost-
ly disaster than all of these combined, qualifies best as
punishment meted out to an impudent culture by an
indignant God. But the worst damage-ecological and
economic-could have been averted, even after six dry
years. had it not been for acts of man precipitated by
the usual combination of wilfulness and avarice. It
wasn't a man-made drought, but man made it very
much worse.
Before the Gold Rush. the streams that drain into
the Central Valley from the Sierra Nevada and the
northern Coast Range represented so many miles of
salmon-spawning habitat that you could have stitched
it all together and run it across the continent and back
again. By the 1960s. 97 percent of it was gone. Friant
Dam single-handedly wiped out a spawning run of a
hundred and fifty thousand fish by blocking and dewa-
tering the entire San Joaquin River. Salmon could live
with the small hydroelectric dams built high in the
mountains decades ago; they cannot live with giant,
impassable multipurpose dams built low in the
foothills, whose main purpose is usually to capture as
llacar6ftcfon fn the Md WestSodna 1994
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much water as possible that can then be taken out of
the rivers.
Despite the worst disruption of salmon habitat
that you can find anywhere on earth, the Sacramento
River and a few tributaries, in the late 1960s, still sup-
ported a surprisingly robust salmon fishery-the most
productive south of the Columbia. There were four dis-
tinct subspecies: a fall run, reared mainly in hatch-
eries, that was the bread and butter of the commercial
salmon fleet; a distinct late-fall run; a large winter run;
and a rapidly declining spring run, a superfish that
goes over forty pounds and blasts through Class Five
rapids on its way to spawning reaches nearly a mile
above sea level in the Sierra Nevada. (The Sacramento
River is unique in the world for its four runs of Chinook
salmon.) In good years, after the war, the Sacramento
fishery could sustain a harvest of several hundred
thousand fish, and in great years a million or more
fish.
The tenacity of the Sacramento River salmon was
remarkable because of the deadly obstacle course the
fish, juveniles and adults, have to run from the begin-
ning to the end of their lives. Shasta Dam blocked off
enormously productive spawning beds in the water-
shed; other dams on important tributaries, especially
the Yuba and the American, did the same. The Red
Bluff diversion dam, at the gateway to the last main-
stem spawning reach, frustrates many thousands of
upriver-migrating adults despite a fish ladder that
goes around it. The intake at the Glenn-Colusa
Irrigation District, capable of diverting 3000 cubic feet
per second, swallows millions of downriver-migrating
juveniles each year. In drier years, when Shasta Lake
swelters for months in hundred-degree heat, the warm
water emanating into the lower river cooks vast num-
bers of eggs and juveniles, which usually cannot toler-
ate water warmer than 60 degrees. An abandoned mint
near Shasta leaches ghostly wastes when it rains, and
agriculture adds pesticides and herbicides.
But the worst hazard to the fishery is the battery of
pumps at the South end of the Delta, which feed the
aqueducts that sustain southern California. When the
State Water Project began operating in the late Sixties,
joining the Central Valley Project, another couple of
million acre-feet of water that used to pour out to sea
was sucked across the Delta by the pumps, confusing
the upriver-migrating adults and entraining tens of
millions of hapless juveniles, which go wherever the
river currents, natural or artificial, want them to go. In
wet years, in the Sixties and Seventies, when the Delta
pumps diverted only 20 percent of the Sacramento
outflow, the escapement ratio was high and millions of
young fish made it to sea, where they could fatten in
ocean pastures and return in great numbers to spawn.
But in drier years, when as much as 50 percent of the
Sacramento River outflow was sucked toward southern
California, escapement was low, salmon mortality was
high, and the commercial fleet-still comprised of
many hundreds of boats-braced itself for poor sea-
sons in the years immediately to come.
As it happened the 1986 floods coincided perfect-
ly with a heavy outmigration of young fish, so the
escapement ratio was better than great. It was fabu-
lous. The offshore catch in two or three years, when
fish of the 1986 class returned to spawn, was going to
be the best in decades.
I first encountered that prediction a few weeks
after the floods in an obscure publication called
Fridays, the biweekly house organ of the Pacific Coast
Federation of Fishermen's Associations, which Is put
out by PCFFA's only paid staff member, a fish proces-
sor's son with a law degree named Zeke Grader. He Is
one of a handful of people in the world who are paid to
think exactly as a salmon would think, which means
that his thinking tends to be the opposite of most
everyone else's.
In the dry months and years following the 1986
floods, Grader's optimism about the 1986-class fish
was counterweighted by a deepening pessimism over
the fishery's long-term prognosis. His reasoning was
simple and not arguable: Salmon have to confront a
drought right away. Everyone else, cushioned by years'
worth of reservoir storage, does not. It might not be
obvious to people, but it was already obvious to the
fish: California, in 1987, had entered a year of severe
drought, and because droughts tend to come in cycles,
there was apt to be another dry year-and then, con-
ceivably, several more. No big floods ("surplus flows"
in water-buffalo argot) were going to flush tens of mil-
lions of newly hatched salmon and steelhead past the
insistent pull of 300,000 horsepower Delta pumps-
not to mention the 160-odd diversion intakes, most
lacking fish screens, between the Delta and Shasta
Dam. In July of 1987, Grader observed in Fridays that 85
percent of the spring flow of the Sacramento River had
been either diverted or held in storage that year, with
unknown but potentially devastating consequences for
the fishery. He quoted Dr. Michael Rozengurt, an expa-
triate Russian fisheries biologist, who compared
Califomia's situation to what the Russians had done to
the Sea of Azov, a spectacular fishery turned Into a bio-
logical desert by Stalin's directive to irrigate a limitless
acreage of cotton.
During the next several years (I know this because
I recently read five years of Fridays over a weekend),
Zeke Grader'sounded more and more like John the
Baptist, although he must have felt more like
Sisyphus. Fridays has only a few thousand readers,
most of whom are West Coast fishermen or fisheries
biologists-who needed no convincing that the
drought could mean disaster for the salmon if extraor-
dinary measures weren't taken to protect them. That is
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the sometimes fatal weakness of anadromous fish: By
insisting on spawning in rivers and estuaries, they are
like an army trapped in a mountain cul-de-sac, easy
pickings for forces, natural or unnatural (which is to
say, human) that are far beyond their control. But after
years of intense drought, as Grader noted again and
again, the Bureau of Reclamation and Department of
Water Resources-which essentially run the
Sacramento River watershed-were still allocating
water as if these were normal times. They had taken
nearly all of the salmon habitat; now they were taking
most of the water-and the fish with it.
The most significant statistics from the drought-
which Zeke Grader, to my knowledge, was the first to
elucidate-really had nothing to do with precipitation
and everything to do with what happened to the pre-
cipitation after it fell.
In 1987. which was categorized as a 'critically dry"
year-the driest of five classifications-the Central
Valley Prolect and State Water Project gave their agri-
cultural customers (who consume 95 percent of the
CVP supply and around 65 percent of the SWP's aver-
age yield) every acre-foot of their water entitlements,
based on the "carryover" they held in storage. The
water managers could have argued. In 1987. that they
were blindsided by the suddenness of the drought, but
in 1988. another critically dry year. agriculture got full
entitlements again. In 1989, a year classified as "dry."
nearly all CVP and SWP customers received full water
deliveries again. It wasn't until 1990. a desolately dry
year despite some late rains in May. that the two huge
water agencies began cutting back their agricultural
customers. But even in that year a big block of users
with water rights predating the Central Valley Project
received normal-year water supplies.
One consequence of this policy (or lack of a poli-
cy) was that carryover storage in Shasta Lake dropped
so low that, in February of 1991. the Bureau predicted
that the reservoir-by far the largest in California-
would be the world's biggest mudflat by fall of that
year, dovm to 2 or 3 percent of its capacity of 4,500.000
acre-feet. The Bureau was rescued, barely, by another
late spell of wet weather in March. but had those
storms not come through there would have been no
CVP water for anyone-fish, fowl. humans, or crops-
by summers end.
From the fisheries point of view, though, the most
devastating consequence was that most of the runoff
that reached the California Delta in those years never
reached the Bay; it was immediately diverted across
the Delta by the projects' huge batteries of pumps. In
fact. from 1987 through 1989. Delta exports increased
every year as river flows and reservoir storage dropped
abysmally, in those three years, runoff to the Delta
averaged nine or ten million acre-feet, while Delta
diversions climbed from 5.2 million acre-feet in 1987
to 6.1 million acre-feet in 1989-a level barely sur-
passed in the wettest years.
On the other hand. the four runs of salmon, whose
young rode out to sea on twenty to thirty million acre-
feet of runoff before the great projects were built, had
had their water supply reduced by almost 90 percent.
Young salmon tend to go where most of the water
flows, and most of It was now flowing into the deadly
maws of the south Delta pumps.
No one could even guess how many tens of mil-
lions, or hundreds of millions, of juvenile salmon per-
ished at the pumps' vast graveyard during the first sev-
eral years of the drought. But the perverse irony was
that. as the future California salmon fishery was being
decimated as never before, the fishermen in 1988
hauled In the biggest harvest since 1945. As Zeke
Grader had predicted two years earlier, the numbers of
returning salmon that year-mostly fall run from the
1986 class that zoomed out to sea on the February
flood tide-were greater than all but the oldest com-
mercial fishermen could remember. The offshore catch
that year totalled 1.400.000 fish. weighing more than
fifteen million pounds-a bonanza worth about a hun-
dred and fifty million dollars. Sport fishermen hauled
in hundreds of thousands more, and another couple of
hundred thousand spawners-about as many as the
depleted rivers could handle--swam to upriver redds.
As newspapers published photographs of salmon
boats listing into port with huge piles of salmon on
board. Zeke Grader was devoting whole issues of
Fridays to a new. antithetical prognosis: that the
salmon industry would suffer catastrophically in the
years ahead. It's possible his own constituency wasn't
listening by then.
But he was right.
In the 1960s. about a hundred and thirty thousand
winter-run salmon returned to the Sacramento River to
spawn--the remnants of a run that probably num-
bered in the half-million range before the state and
federal projects were built. By the early seventies, the
winter run was down to about twenty thousand fish. By
1987. it was down to two thousand. By 1991, the biol-
ogists counting the fish may have come close to out-
numbering the fish: 191 spawners made it to the Red
Bluff Diversion Dam. The spring run. much harder to
count, was probably down to two thousand sur-
vivors-mainly due to depleted rivers, which were
partly the fault of the drought, and unnatural Delta
flows, which were not. By then, the fall (hatchery) run,
which made up most of the huge 1988 catch, had
crashed too. In 1992, the Pacific Fisheries Management
Council imposed the most stringent quotas in history
on the commercial fleet, and they applied, to varying
degrees, from central California to the Canadian bor-
der because California salmon tend to head north
DaC0rUtLtCf,:n ki ffis Md WutSp~q 1994
Marc P. Reisner Volume 1. Number 1
once at sea. The offshore California harvest in 1992
was about 150,000 fish. A lot of boats never bothered
to go out; if they had, the whole season would have
yielded a few dozen fish per boat, worth less than the
fuel required to catch them. But even boats in
Washington State were forced to languish at dockside
for weeks because farmers in California, twelve hun-
dred miles away, were granted normal deliveries of
subsidized water during the first several years of the
worst drought in that state's history.
As it turned out, however, the hand of justice
could be as perverse as the kiss of irony. In 1991 and
again in 1992, the CVP and SWP water contractors
finally experienced the same sort of water rationing-
and worse-that salmon and fishermen had endured
since the drought's first week. The State Water Project
made no deliveries to agriculture in 1991-none. Most
of the Bureau's customers saw their water supply
reduced by 75 percent. In 1992, an election year, they
got a little more water through the direct intervention
of someone who had received millions of dollars in
San Joaquin Valley PAC money, the president of the
United States. Many growers shifted from surface
water to groundwater, but they paid a price (ground-
water can be several times more expensive); mean-
while, hundreds of thousands of acres were taken out
of production. Tens of thousands of people-mostly
farmworkers-lost their jobs, welfare caseloads rose
astronomically, and in some agricultural counties
unemployment rates brushed 30 percent.
Because the reservoirs had been so drastically
depleted during the first four years of the drought, the
Department of Water Resources and the Bureau had
no choice but to cut the growers off. In 1991 and again
in 1992, the CVP had just over five million acre-feet in
storage in May (when most runoff has entered the
reservoirs), and the growers-irrigating millions of
acres-could have used it all up by July. But now there
was an entirely new reason why they couldn't let much
of the water go. By 1992, the winter-run Chinook was
listed as a threatened species by the federal govern-
ment and as an endangered species by the state of
California. The spring-run salmon was not yet listed
because, as part of the recovery plan, almost all
salmon fishing off California and Oregon might have
had to be banned. (By the fall of 1992, however, the
spring run, now represented by fewer than a thousand
survivors, looked as if it might be listed too.) The late-
fall-run Chinook was regarded by fisheries biologists
as a species of special concern, which meant that it
might have to be listed too. It was not inconceivable, if
the drought went on, that almost every salmon in
California might eventually join the endangered
species list.
The San Joaquin Valley growers, of course, were
inclined to blame whole situation on everything and
everyone but themselves: if not exclusively on nature's
drought, then on high-seas drift-net fishing, on ocean
warming, on overfishing by the West Coast salmon
fleet (the most drastically policed fishing fleet In the
world), on dredge spoils dumped into San Francisco
Bay, on seals and sea lions, on logging In the water-
sheds, on polluted runoff from abandoned mines-on
any cause with a quarter-gram of plausibility. All of
these horrors resulted in the loss of some fish; all of
them combined are less responsible than the combi-
nation of empty rivers, intolerably warm rivers, and
rivers flowing in reverse toward power and wealth.
So the fate of California agriculture is now help-
lessly entwined-because of its insatiable thirst for
water-with the fate of the California salmon fisheries,
In October of 1992, Congressman George Miller of
California, the new chairman of the House Interior
Committee, and Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey saw
their Central Valley Project Reform Act blown through
the House and Senate and onto the president's desk.
Members of Congress from the Northwest voted for
the bill in order to protect their own salmon fleets;
members from urban California voted for the bill
because their constituents had endured severe water
rationing while agriculture had not: members from
nearly every other state voted for the bill because, In
their opinion, agribusiness in California has gotten
everything it wanted for far too long, often at the
expense of farmers in their own states. Among other
things, the Miller-Bradley legislation takes 800,000
acre-feet of water from agriculture and dedicates It to
wetlands and fisheries-the first such reallocation
since the Central Valley Project Act was passed In
1933. The only question is whether it isn't already too
late. In the fall of 1992, more than 300 of the 350-odd
salmon boats that comprise the fleet at Fort Bragg,
California, were for sale, and winter-run salmon from
the class of 1991, tatters of evolution, were being
reared for tanks at San Francisco's Steinhart
Aquarium, like the condors at the San Diego Zoo.
"You can replant an orchard and have it back In
ten years," Zeke Grader told me one morning in the
summer of 1992. "You lose a salmon that took twenty
thousand years to evolve and you never get it back. The
fishermen know that closing the season is their only
choice. They know it's their only hope-if they have to
starve for a year, or two, or a decade, it's the only way
to save their industry. We're chucking a whole heritage,
Fishing is the oldest industry in California. You have to
go up the coast to appreciate the despair. Even then
you really can't. You just can't. Everyone's broke.
Everyone's living off relatives or on welfare. This was
pure plunder. It's basically like the bison and the
Indians: The settlers and the hide hunters killed all the
buffalo, so they didn't have to kill the Indians, The
Indians couldn't survive without the buffalo. Now the
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cotton and alfalfa farmers killed most of the salmon.
with some help from everyone else. I don't know if they
consciously wanted to get us out of the way. As long as
we have salmon, we'll have fishermen, and as long
there're fishermen they're going to be a pain in the ass.
But a destitute fishing industry isn't a lobby. It's no
one's constituency-it's just a sentimentality. All we
have now, besides Miller-Bradley, is the Endangered
Species Act. I don't know how long it's going to last. If
the growers had the political power to get all the water
they wanted when California was drying up and blow-
ing away, they might have figured that overturning the
act-or seeing that it didn't affect their water supply-
would be a piece of cake."
On May 20, 1979. an enormously tall, charismatic,
and obsessed young man named Mark Dubois hiked
into the canyon of the Stanislaus River, concealed
himself near the river's edge, threw a length of chain
around an undercut boulder, padlocked the ends of
the chain together, tossed the key into the river, and
leaned back against the boulder, waiting to drown.
The flood that was going to submerge Mark
Dubois within a day or two wasn't moving downriver
from the thick snowfields melting rapidly in the Sierra
Nevada. This was a flood moving in reverse, up the
river. A few months earlier, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers had closed the gates of New Melones Dam,
its most recent snub of nature, a mammoth rockpile
wedged in Iron Canyon a few miles downriver. The
reservoir had already submerged the older, much
smaller Melones Dam and its reservoir, and now its
tentacles of turbid water were creeping up the side
creeks and the main river itself. Dubois had concealed
himself somewhere in Camp Nine Gorge, nine miles of
superlative Class Three whitewater that could have
been conceived by Disneyworld engineers on amphet-
amines; after the Youghgighenny River in
Pennsylvania. it was the most popular rafting and
kayaking run in the United States. Dubois, an expert
boater and evangelical environmentalist, was the sort
of fixture on this river that old Harry Truman was on
the slopes of Mount St. Helens before it buried him In
volcanic ash-you could hardly think of the Stanislaus
River without thinking of Mark Dubois. He had invest-
ed ten years of his life battling New Melones Dam, and
for a while it almost looked as if he might win. But in
the Seventies, in a contest with the Corps, the Bureau
of Reclamation. and California's unquenchable irriga-
tion lobby, he and his minions really had no chance.
They were the cavalry. he was the Sioux. the chain and
padlock were his Wounded Knee.
By then the Corps's regional hierarchy knew
Dubois almost intimately and chose not to undervalue
his inhuman will. If he said he was prepared to die. he
probably was. Within thirty hours, the spill gates of the
dam were opened, and a posse of searchers combed
the river canyon on foot. by helicopter, and in rafts, try-
ing to find his hiding spot. Even though some of them
must have passed within a few yards of it, they did not.
Meanwhile. the whole story had blown around the
worid-Dubois was being compared to the monks who
incinerated themselves in Vietnam-and reporters and
people from all over the place were roaring toward the
Stanislaus to see what the fuss was all about.
I was one of the first of them. and. probably for the
only time In my life. I saw a river born again. A short
distance below the old Parrott's Ferry Bridge. where
eighty thousand boaters had hauled out in the river's
final year. was a small bouncy rapids, an effervescence
of frothy, lumping haystack waves. On the morning of
May 21. the reservoir was beginning to eat through
them. I sat on the bank and watched. One after anoth-
er. the big waves flattened out, their booming stilled,
their splashing stopped...then they disappeared under
gurgling little whirlpools, and where there had been
rapids minutes earlier the river went dead calm. Late
that day. however, the Corps began spilling the reser-
voir. and as It receded, the rapids began to reappear.
First there was still water, then the water began to
move, then It grew riffly and agitated, and then the
rapid waves began rising up. gaining height, gaining
force, splashing and spraying and churning as they had
for thousands of years-suddenly, from one minute to
the next. there was a river again.
But not for long.
Jerry Brown, who was governor at the time, decid-
ed to Intercede personally with Mark Dubois. promis-
ing to try to hold the reservoir below the Parrots Ferry
Bridge. and Dubois, who had told a single emissary
where he was and given him a padlock key. walked out
of his hiding place. Between its clenched teeth, the
Corps mumbled something about respecting the will
of the governor of a sovereign state, which was its way
of saying it would just wait everyone out. During 1982.
the heavy rains and snows of the late 1970s returned.
The Corps's and the Bureau's constituency-mostly
conservative farmers and Republican towns with a
God-given right to subsidized water and power and
free flood control-staged demonstrations in
Sacramento after releases from New Melones Dam
overtopped the river levees and began flooding their
fields. Jerry Brown. possessing one of the shortest
attention spans of any politician who ever lived, soon
lost Interest in the whole mess. The Bureau of
Reclamation. which was supposed to market the water
in the reservoir the Corps got to build, complained
about all the waste-even though it hadn't signed a
single contract to sell any of the water and had no
means of getting it to any of the growers who alleged-
ly wanted it. But this only meant that. if the reservoir
was filled, southern California. by default, had a new
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water supply. What did a bunch of rafters matter,
stacked against this? New Melones Lake had filled all
of Camp Nine Gorge by the following spring. Another
river that had flowed wild for hundreds of thousands of
years was a memory.
Coincidentally or not, however, the filling of New
Melones Lake brought the first Age of Dams to a
close-at least in the American West. In California, vir-
tually nothing has been built since. It has been the
same everywhere else. The Narrows Dam in Colorado,
Orme Dam in Arizona, the Garrison Project in North
Dakota, O'Neill Dam in Nebraska, Auburn Dam, the
North Coast dams-none of the projects whose con-
struction seemed likely when I began writing this book
exists. There has been no NAWAPA-scale apotheosis;
it's hardly mentioned anymore. The dam-building
machine didn't even coast down like a turbine going
off-peak. it just suddenly fell apart.
So many factors have played a role that it's hard
to judge which mattered most. You have to give some
credit to Mark Dubois: Like Rosa Parks climbing defi-
antly aboard her segregated bus, he started something
that couldn't be quelled. Millions of people who had
never seen the Stanislaus River found themselves feel-
ing upset, if not infuriated, over its loss. Among envi-
ronmentalists, "Remember the Stanislaus" is what
"Stay the Course" was to the Reagan faithful.
Meanwhile, river recreation-rafting, kayaking, fishing,
just watching the river go-boomed all through the
Eighties, in a way that hauling a sinister, gas-guzzling
fighter jet of a motorboat to the local mudflat did not.
(Wallace Stegner estimates that about five thousand
Americans who were alive in the 1930s had ever float-
ed a whitewater river; by the early 1990s, thirty-five
million had.) Rafting is fairly big business in states like
Colorado, where whitewater companies advertise on
billboards that once promoted agricultural chemicals,
shale oil development, or Wayne Aspinall. Having a
captive audience helps: A couple of days spent floating
a beautiful, threatened river can turn whole families
into environmental radicals where the fate of that river
is concerned.
But the water lobby itself deserves most of the
credit for its sudden drought of opportunities. Back in
the days when most members of Congress cheerfully
voted for each other's dams, the best sites disap-
peared as fast as the rivers on which the dams were
built. By the eighties, you were left with ludicrous pro-
jects like the Narrows Dam, where you had to build a
subsurface dam twice as large as the one aboveground
in order to stop the river from seeping out underneath.
A full-size Lake Auburn, which could hold 2,400,000
acre-feet of water-but would deliver only two or three
hundred thousand acre-feet a year, because most of
the American River is already captured and appropri-
ated; Auburn Dam would need awesome runoff In
order to fill up and remain full-is projected to cost
about two billion dollars, which means it will cost
twice as much. Hoover Dam, which captures thirty mil-
lion acre-feet of water (and routinely delivers nine or
ten million acre-feet a year) was completed in 1936 for
forty-eight million dollars-million-and change. If you
are the Bureau of Reclamation, you are left trying to
justify a dam that would yield 3 percent of Hoover's
water, and perhaps 8 percent of its power, and cost ten
times more in uninflated dollars. You also have to
explain why you are building a gigantic dam next door
to a presumably active earthquake fault.
Finding the money to erect pyramids such as this
was no problem for the pharaohs who ran Congress
thirty or forty years ago, when the whole federal bud-
get was smaller than the portion that pays Interest
every year on a $4 trillion national debt. But today,
when a clutch of visionaries representing Utah water
districts troops into the U.S. Capitol to lobby for some
new taxpayer-financed dam, they get the same
response the departing bunch from Texas just
received: It's conceivable-conceivable-that Congress
might find a little money for the project, If the local
sponsors agree to pay, let us say, one-half of the
cost-up front. That is how water projects that are a
matter of life or death become projects a region can
live without.
But the thorniest desert in which today's water
lobby finds itself wandering is the ecological legacy of
its predecessors. By erecting thirty thousand dams of
significant size across the American West, they dewa-
tered countless rivers, wiped out millions of acres of
riparian habitat, shut off many thousands of river miles
of salmon habitat, silted over spawning beds, poi-
soned return flows with agricultural chemicals, set the
plague of livestock loose on the arid land-In a nut-
shell, they made it close to impossible for numerous
native species to survive. So today, if you want to erect
a dam on any tributary of the Colorado River, you have
to worry about its effecfs on the squawfish, a federally
listed endangered species. If you want to siphon more
fresh water out of the Sacramento-San loaquin River
Delta, you have to ponder the effect on the spring- and
winter-run Chinook salmon, on the nearly vanished
striped bass (an introduced species, but one with a big
and tough sport fishing lobby), on the Delta smelt (a
serious candidate for listing under the Endangered
Species Act), and on two dozen, three dozen, who
knows how many land-based species whose precarious
hold on existence might be lost through the conver-
sion of remnant deserts or marshes or grasslands to
crops, or of fecund estuaries into sterile saltwater
sumps.
The fiercest environmental battles of the 1990s
are likely to be fought in the American West, and many
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of them-most of them-may, to one degree or anoth-
er, involve the Endangered Species Act. But some
would be fought even if that act were written out of
law. The battles over salmon in California will probably
seem as nothing compared to those in the Northwest.
because there salmon are a real industry, the Columbia
River's commercial and sport fishery Is valued in the
many hundreds of millions of dollars a year. The
Columbia was once the greatest salmon river in the
world: Fifteen million fish returned every year to
spawn; today there are fewer than two million, and half
of the watershed's salmon runs (dozens in all) are in
fairly imminent danger of going extinct.
What it all boils down to is undoing the wrongs
caused by earlier generations doing what they thought
was right. The Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of
Engineers knew that their dams would ruin the
Columbia River fishery, or most of it. as the years and
decades went by. But they convinced themselves, and
the Congress-and. for that matter, most people living
in the Pacific Northwest-that all the new power and
water was worth the price. It was simply how everyone
thought-then. In 1967. in order to be ready for Vice
President Hubert Humphrey. who was coming out to
dedicate John Day Dam and who wanted to feel the
thrum of its turbines, the Corps dosed the dam gates
before the fish ladders were operational, condemning
a migration of hundreds of thousands of salmon and steel-
head to death. The vice president's schedule couldn't
be changed. The Corps, a perfect representative of its
era, never bothered to ask whether the same might be
true of the fish.
By the seventies, however. America's values were
utterly different, because everyone's experiences had
changed. People who came through the Depression
didn't just eat salmon, they survived on it. and they
were sick of it; it was known as poverty steak, because
it sold for ten cents a pound. Those who were born
later could only listen to stories of rivers you could
cross on the backs of salmon, of creeks where they
crowded themselves out of the water and flopped into
the woods. Suddenly there was plenty of cotton and
fruit grown on irrigation water; there was plenty of
cheap steak, because subsidized water was raising mil-
lions of cattle on irrigated alfalfa and grass. There was
plenty of cheap hydroelectricity, just two or three gen-
erations after the Depression, when many rural towns
in the West had no electricity at all. All things man-
made had become plentiful, but a great menu of things
once abundant in nature had become scarce.
And now people were demanding some of it back.
it didn't seem possible when I began writing this
book, but by now it is beginning to seem plausible
after all. After damming the canyons and dewatering
the rivers in order to spill wealth on the land, we are
going to take some of the water back, and put it where.
one could argue-as more and more Westerners now
do-it really belongs. Law has been the ignition, but a
great, almost epochal shift in values has worked as the
engine of change. In the mid-eighties, after being ham-
mered by a landmark public trust decision, the city of
Los Angeles reduced its diversions from the streams
feeding Mono Lake by 60.000 acre-feet a year. The level
of the lake, a vast salty haven for migratory waterfowl.
began to stabilize after dropping dramatically over
forty years. A few years later, the city actually returned
some water to the Owens River. which began to flow
again for the first time in almost half a century. It
didn't flow as it once did, but at least you could call it
a river again. It flowed out of new history. William
Mulholland was dead. The board of his Department of
Water and Power had been all but taken over by envi-
ronmentalists. The mayor of Los Angeles. Tom
Bradley. said with genuine contrition that he wanted to
repair some of the damage his city had done.
It was the same everywhere. In 1992. the newly
appointed Commissioner of Reclamation. Dennis
Underwood. hailed not from Bountiful. Utah. or
Orchard City. Colorado. but from Santa Monica. His
new regional director in California. Roger Patterson.
had just decided to dedicate outflows from Folsom
Lake to the California Delta instead of cotton farmers
and was holding hundreds of thousands of acre-feet in
Shasta Lake for the sake of fish instead of alfalfa.
Patterson said he looked forward to implementing the
just-passed Central Valley Project Reform Act-legis-
lation that might have prompted Floyd Dominy to
resign in disgust. After all, he had acquired a much
more important constituency-a public that was
beginning to wonder why such an agency even exists-
and a loaded gun called the Endangered Species Act
was aimed at his head.
Even in the Northwest. where the sheer size of the
dams. and the sheer value of hydroelectricity, make
change terrifically difficult, it almost has to occur. You
can perhaps imagine California salmon going extinct.
but you can imagine no such thing in the Pacific
Northwest. a region the salmon very nearly symbol-
izes. The great mainstem dams will never be torn
down. but smaller dams may be. The federal govem-
ment already has plans to purchase a high dam on the
Elwha River. which drains the north side of the
Olympic Range and hosts all five species of Pacific
salmon, in order to tear it down. And the mainstem
dams. at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars, will
be re-engineered in order to block fewer adult salmon
and pass more juveniles through. Holes may be
punched through their immense, solid insides and
then sealed with ponderous metal gates; when the fish
are running downriver, the gates may be opened to let
them pass without becoming chopped liver in the tur-
bines. The river may be -managed- (for better or worse.
Dacorcann in the AM WstSn na 1994
Marc . ResnerVolume 1. Number 1
it is in human hands) in a completely different way: the
reservoirs rapidly drawn down to quicken the current,
the gates opened for the fish, the whole process
repeated, again and again, water tumbling down a lad-
der, until each successive run is safely at sea.
Forty years ago, only a handful of heretics, howl-
ing at wilderness, challenged the notion that the West
needed hundreds of new dams. Today they are almost
vindicated. There is more talk of deconstruction than
of construction: of minor dams demolished, of big
dams made "environmentally sound," of marginal
acreage retired and water returned to its source, of
flows bypassing turbines to flush salmon and steel-
head out to sea. How can this happen? The region's
population is growing and, in places, exploding.
(California has added seven million people since New
Melones Dam.) More people need more water and
power and food. Asia sends its surplus population to
California and the Northwest; the Mexican border is
porous as a sieve.
It's only recently-mainly in the years since this
book first appeared-that Westerners have begun to
ask where their water goes, what it costs, and what it
earns. That inquiry may produce the most revolution-
ary results since the Reclamation Act.
In California, for example, enough water for
greater Los Angeles was still being used, in 1986, to
raise irrigated pasture for livestock. A roughly equal
amount-enough for twenty million people at home,
at play, and at work-was used that year to raise alfal-
fa, also for horses, sheep, and (mainly) cows.
The more one tries to make sense of this, the less
success one has. Feeding irrigated grass to cows is as
wasteful a use of water as you can conceive. Pasture is
hydrologically inefficient in the extreme, and, meta-
bolically speaking, so are cows: You need seven or
eight feet of water in the hot deserts to keep grass
alive, which means that you need almost fifty thousand
pounds of water to raise one pound of cow. (Feeding
alfalfa to cows requires even more water, but at least
alfalfa fixes nitrogen in the soil.)
If the livestock industry earned California real
money, and if cows (unlike avocadoes or artichokes)
couldn't be raised on rainfall in thirty-five other states,
then giving more water to cows than to humans in the
nation's richest and most populous state-a semi-
desert state at the mercy of a precarious water sup-
ply-might make a grain or two of sense. In 1985, how-
ever, the pasture crop was worth about $100 million,
while southern California's economy was worth $300
billion, but irrigated pasture used more water than Los
Angeles and San Diego combined. When you added
cotton (a price-supported crop worth about $900 mil-
lion that year) to alfalfa and pasture, you had a live-
stock industry and a cotton industry consuming much
more water than everyone in urban California-and
producing as much wealth in a year as the urban econ-
omy rings up in three or four days. (Rice, another crop
that needs lots of water, consumed more than the
entire Bay Area, but the state's rice acreage supports
much of the Pacific Flyway on waste grain and an enor-
mous winter production of invertebrate food, so I am
leaving the rice acreage alone.)
It isn't much different in any other western state.
In Colorado, the alfalfa crop is worth a couple of hun-
dred million dollars a year, while tourism Is worth
about five billion dollars a year. To raise alfalfa, you
have to dam, dewater, and otherwise destroy the rivers
that many of the tourists come to fish, to raft, or sim-
ply to see. The hydroelectricity that could be generat-
ed down river by water used to raise alfalfa Is poten-
tially worth more than the crop. In Idaho, the money
crop is potatoes, but the crops that use most of the
state's water are alfalfa and grass. Each cow raised In
the Columbia River watershed-where millions of
cows are raised-indirectly consumes water for sever-
al salmon. Then the cow pollutes the rivers, overgrazes
the hillsides, erodes the strearnbanks, and conspires,
beyond the workings of its feeble brain, to ruin the fish
and their habitat in other ways (for example, by send-
ing forth acres of methane-rich flatulence that hasten
the greenhouse effect).
In an arid or semi-arid region, you can Irrigate
low-value, thirsty crops such as alfalfa and pasture
grass only if you have cheap water-if your fields are
riparian, or if your dams and aqueducts were built
decades ago, or if you get your water subsidized by the
taxpayers, as one of every three of the far West's full-
time irrigation farmers does. If you need forty or fifty
thousand pounds of water in places like California and
Colorado to irrigate enough fodder to raise two dollars
worth of cow, you can't even consider it if forty thou-
sand pounds of water costs seven or eight dollars (as
it would if you bought it from the California Water
Project). But it makes perfectly good sense If the gov-
ernment sells you the same quantity for thirty or forty
cents-as it does if the Central Valley Project Is your
source.
If free-market mechanisms-which much of west-
ern agriculture publicly applauds and privately
abhors-were actually allowed to work, the West's
water "shortage" would be exposed for what It Is: the
sort of shortage you expect when inexhaustible
demand chases an almost free good. (if someone were
selling Porsches for three thousand dollars apiece,
there would be a shortage of those, too.) California has
a shortage of water because it has a surfeit of cows-
it's really almost as simple as that.
The urban areas in the West have been slow to
recognize all this, but lately they have begun to recog-
nize it with a vengeance. The Metropolitan Water
District is flooding its millions of customers with liter-
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ature that shows how a thousand acre-feet of water
used in hightech industry can create sixteen thousand
jobs, and how the same thousand acre-feet of water
used on pasture farms creates eight lobs. Eight. This
kind of stuff infuriates the San Joaquin Valley. Its erst-
while ally in the water wars. so valley mouthpieces
respond in a manner that inspires the Met not just to
anger but to retribution. All the old alliances are falling
apart. Southern California wants nothing more to do
with the San Joaquin; its water barons would rather
scheme over sushi with environmentalists, because
they represent the new nexus of power. Even the rice
growers in the Sacramento Valley want little to do with
the San loaquin Valley; they raise tots of waterfowl
food on acreage that the birds of the Pacific Flyway
have come to depend on, and most conservationists
now acknowledge that fact, and some have even begun
to like rice-so why should the rice industry, which gets
little subsidized water, carry the San loaquin Valley's
hod?
Meanwhile. all kinds of new alliances are begin-
ning to form. The Sacramento Valley has its own water
lobby, which has begun to hold meetings with the
salmon fishermen, searching for solutions to their
water shortage-which is devastatingly real. Las Vegas
and Reno, which represent 95 percent of Nevada's
economy but use 10 percent of its water (alfalfa grow-
ers use most of the rest), may fight like hyenas over
monstrous gambling palaces that Japanese companies
want to build, but they are in sweet accord on water
policy. The new chief of the Las Vegas Valley Water
District, a forceful woman named Patricia Mulwray (the
murdered hero in Chinatown had the same last name).
also happens to be chairwoman of a new Washington
lobby group representing most of the urban water
agencies in the western states. Its agenda is simple:
more water for cities, more for the environment, and
less for agriculture-especially water-gorging, low-
value agriculture, which usually means cows. "It's not
really the irrigators' water.' says an urban water agency
lobbyist, still too cautious to let me use his name. -it
belongs to the people of the states. They have allowed
the growers to put all that water to a reasonable and
beneficial use. But those words could mean something
entirely different in the future. What's so reasonable
and beneficial about ruining salmon rivers to raise
subsidized, surplus crops while industries that employ
lots of people decide to relocate to wetter states?'
The irrigation lobby still has a few things going for
it. mainly sentimentality, tradition, and law. In many
western states, it's the irrigation districts that set
water policy: They can forbid sales of water rights from
farms to cities beyond the district boundaries, and
many of them do. And the irrigation lobby still has a
few people convinced that, if it doesn't get almost all
the region's water, then the whole world will starve.
But the growers and their allies (anyone who wants to
build more dams) are fighting a rearguard battle, and
they know It. A number of states have legitimized water
transfers, and a number of others-notably
California-are going to soon. With George Miller now
presiding over the House Interior Committee, the
growers may be lucky to get any more subsidized fed-
eral water at all.
The West's real crisis is one of inertia, of will, and
of myth. As Wallace Stegner wrote, somehow the cow
and the cowboy and the irrigated field came to sym-
bolize the region, instead of the bison and the salmon
and the antelope that once abounded here. Stegner
said that he spent much of his writing career breaking
lances against windmills turned by the cowboy mys-
tique. You needn't even get rid of the cowboys, who
add color and relief to a culture that is becoming
depressingly urbanized and, worse, suburbanized. But
they might be driving bison. in reasonable numbers.
instead of cows. and raising them, for the most part.
on unirrigated land-which bison tolerate far better
than cows. In a West that once and for all made sense,
you might Import a lot more meat and dairy products
from states where they are raised on rain, rather than
dream of Importing those states* rain.
You would have a West where most people live in
contained cancers called cities (as they already do.
anyway), and where more rural people would provide
the opportunities for people from the cities-for peo-
ple from all over the world-to enjoy the region's
splendors as they once were. A region where people
begin to recognize that water left in rivers can be worth
a lot more-in revenues, in jobs-than water taken out
of the rivers. Maybe even a region where a lot of peo-
ple really don't give a damn how much money a river
can produce.
At some point, perhaps within my lifetime, the
American West will go back to the future rather than
forward to the past.
M.R.
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